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NOTES
VARIANCE ADMINISTRATION IN INDIANA - PROBLEMS
AND REMEDIES
The zoning variance is designed to provide relief in individual cases
from the restraints on land use that are specified in the local zoning ordi-
nance. Some writers and cases' state that the primary value of variances
is that they protect zoning ordinances from constitutional attack on the
basis of the fifth and fourteenth amendments' and similar provisions in
state constitutions.' Other sources emphasize that variances are desirable
in order to avoid unnecessary interference with private property,' as-
sure that land is used,' correct unequal burdens of zoning that the legis-
lature would have corrected had it foreseen them,' and "alleviate the
situations where the harm to a particular individual outweighs the value
that would be derived by the community if strict adherence to the ordi-
nance were maintained."8
The responsibility for general planning and for devising and amend-
ing zoning ordinances lies with local plan commissions and legislative
bodies. Petitions for variances from these ordinances are heard and
decided by boards of zoning appeals. These boards are administrative,
not legislative, in nature. Therefore, they should not have the power to
1. E.g., Baker, The Zoning Board of Appeals, 10 MINN. L. REv. 277, 280 (1926).
2. E.g., Town of Homecroft v. Macbeth, 238 Ind. 57, 148 N.E.2d 563 (1958);
Freeman v. Bd. of Adjustment, 97 Mont. 342, 34 P.2d 534 (1934).
3. The fifth and fourteenth amendments provide that no person shall be deprived
of property without due process of law. Restrictions placed on property by zoning
laws do not violate the due process clause if such restrictions are a valid exercise of the
police power. Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). To constitute a
valid exercise of the police power, the restrictions must bear a reasonable relation to
the protection of public health, safety or welfare. Corthouts v. Town of Newington,
140 Conn. 284, 99 A.2d 112 (1953) ; Marquette National Bank v. County of Cook, 24
Ill. 2d 497, 182 N.E.2d 147 (1962). It follows that where the restrictions of a zoning
ordinance deprive a property owner of the use of his property without furthering the
public health, safety or welfare, there is an unconstitutional taking of property without
due process of law. By providing for variances in such cases, the application of uncon-
stitutional restrictions is avoided, and the constitutionality of the ordinance is main-
tained.
4. E.g., IND. CONsT. art. 1, § 21, which provides that private property shall not
be taken by law without just compensation. This provision is violated when application
of a zoning ordinance makes it unfeasible to use property as zoned. Metropolitan Bd.
of Zoning Appeals v. Gateway Corp., - Ind. - , 268 N.E.2d 736 (1971).
5. E.g., Zahodiakin Engineering Corp. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 8 N.J. 386,
86 A.2d 127 (1952).
6. Note, Zoning Variances, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1396 (1961) [hereinafter cited as
Zoning Variances].
7. 2 C. RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING 37-1 (3d ed. 1972).
8. Note, Zoning Variances and Exceptions: The Philadelphia Experience, 103
U. PA. L. REv. 516, 519 (1955).
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perpetrate de facto amendments of the zoning ordinance. Since an exces-
sive number of variances does effect a change in the zoning scheme and
thus functions as an amendment of the ordinance, variances should be
granted only sparingly' and under unusual circumstances peculiar to the
property involved."0
Numerous problems have been attributed to an excessive number of
variances. Their quantity, it is argued, contributes to the decreased utility
of zoning as a positive planning tool, retards later sound development in
undeveloped areas, and contributes to urban blight and neighborhood
decay." Since variances are not reflected on zoning maps, excessive
variances may mislead prospective purchasers as to the character of an
area,' 2 thus undermining confidence in the zoning ordinance as descrip-
tive of the nature of a neighborhood. Residents of an area also build up
expectations in reliance on the zoning scheme; these expectations are not
met when an excessive number of variances in effect alter that scheme.
Excessive variances are the result of a malfunctioning of the variance
granting system. This note undertakes a brief survey of the present
Indiana law on variances and of data indicating a malfunctioning, ex-
amines several causes of this malfunctioning, and proposes some remedies
which may be implemented on both state and local levels, through legis-
lative, administrative, and judicial reforms."
PRESENT INDIANA LAW
Indiana law dictates various standards to be applied by the boards of
zoning appeals in granting or denying a variance, depending upon the
locale. These standards, as well as the procedure to be followed on appeal,
are established by statute. Three sets of statutes apply to three types of
jurisdictions: (1) counties containing first class cities, 4 (2) counties
9. Bd. of Zoning Appeals v. Moyer, 108 Ind. App. 198, 27 N.E.2d 905 (1940) ; 2
ET YOKELY, ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE 194 (3d ed. 1965) [hereinafter cited as YOKELY1.
10. Thus, if a land use problem is shared by neighboring property, a variance is
not justified. In such cases, relief may be obtained only through legislative action or
judicial review of the validity of the ordinance. Reps, Discretionary Powers of the
Board of Zoning Appeals, 20 LAW & CONTE P. PROB. 280, 286 (1955) [hereinafter
cited as Reps].
11. Reps, supra note 10, at 282.
12. Zoning Variances, .supra note 6, at 1406.
13. It has been argued that excessive variances are a symptom of an inadequate
system of planning and zoning which needs to be completely reexamined and revamped.
Dukeminier & Stapleton, The Zoning Board of Adjustment: A Ca.se Study in
Misrule, 50 Ky. L.J. 273, 350 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Dukeminier]. This note
does not deal with the revision of Indiana's planning system as a whole, but only
suggests ways in which that system may be improved by revising the manner in which
variances are administered.
14. For the statutory provisions on boards of zoning appeals in counties with
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with area planning departments,"5 and (3) all other counties.'
In counties with first class cities, the boards are authorized to grant
variances upon a finding that:
I. The grant will not be injurious to the public health, safety,
morals, and general welfare of the community.
2. The use or value of the area adjacent to the property in-
cluded in the variance will not be affected in a substantially
adverse manner.
3. The need for the variance arises from some condition pecu-
liar to the property involved and such condition is not due
to the general conditions of the neighborhood.
4. The strict application of the terms of the ordinance will con-
stitute an unusual and unnecessary hardship if applied to
the property for which the variance is sought.
5. The grant of the variance does not interfere substantially
with the metropolitan comprehensive plan .. .. '
The decision of the board is subject to either administrative or judicial
review.'"
first class cities, see IND. CODE §§ 18-7-2-59 to 18-7-2-62 (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 53-
957 to 53-960 (Supp. 1972) ; IND. CODE §§ 18-7-2-63 to 18-7-2-68 (1971), IND. ANN. STAT.
§§ 53-961 to 53-966 (1964); IND. CODE §§ 18-7-2-69, 18-7-2-70 (1971), IND. ANN.
STAT. §§ 53-967, 53-968 (Supp. 1972); IND. ANN. STAT. § 53-969 (Supp. 1972); Im.
CODE §§ 18-7-2-72, 18-7-2-73 (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 53-970, 53-971 (Supp. 1972);
IND. CODE §§ 18-7-2-74, 18-7-2-75 (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 53-972, 53-973 (1964);
IND. ANN. STAT. § 53-974 (Supp. 1972); IND. CODE §§ 18-7-2-77 to 18-7-2-79 (1971),
IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 53-975 to 53-977 (1964); IND. CODE § 18-7-2-80 (1971), IND.
ANN. STAT. § 53-978 (Supp. 1972); IND. CODE §§ 18-7-2-81, 18-7-2-82 (1971), IND.
ANN. STAT. §§ 53-979, 53-980 (1964); IND. CODE §§ 18-7-2-83 to 18-7-2-85 (1971),
IND. ANN. STAT. § 53-981 to 53-982(a) (Supp. 1972); IND. CODE §§ 18-7-2-86 to
18-7-2-88 (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. § 53-983 to 53-985 (1964). These provisions
presently apply only to Marion County.
15. For the statutory provisions on boards of zoning appeals in counties with area
planning departments, see IND. CODE § 18-7-4-65 to 18-7-4-75 (1971), IND. ANN.
STAT. § 53-1064 to 53-1074 (1964); IND. CODE § 18-7-4-76 (1971), IND. ANN. STAT.
§ 53-1075 (Supp. 1972) ; IND. CODE §§ 18-7-4-77 to 18-7-4-82 (1971), IND. ANN. STAT.
§ 53-1076 to 53-1081 (1964); IND. CODE § 18-7-4-83 (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. §
53-1082 (Supp. 1972) ; IND. CODE H§ 18-7-4-84 to "18-7-4-91 (1971), IND. ANN. STAT.
§ 53-1083 to 53-1090 (1964).
16. For the statutory provisions on boards of zoning appeals in these counties,
see IND. CODE §§ 18-7-5-69 to 18-7-5-79 (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. § 53-767 to 53-775
(1964); IND. CODE § 18-7-5-80 (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. § 53-776 (Supp. 1972); IND.
CODE §§ 18-7-5-81 to 18-7-5-95 (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 53-777 to 53-791 (1964).
See also IND. CODE § 18-7-3-11 (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. § 53-808a (1964), which
controls membership of boards of zoning appeals in counties with populations of 90,000
to 175,000 and with consolidated planning operations. The boards in such counties are
governed by the variance standards and review procedure which apply to counties
without first class cities or area planning departments.
17. INn. CODE § 18-7-2-71 (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. § 53-969 (Supp. 1972).
18. The granting of a variance may be appealed to the metropolitan plan corn-
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In cities, towns, and counties which have established an area planning
department that operates on a county-wide basis, the boards of zoning
appeals are required to apply the same standards with the exception of
number 5.1 However, use variances, i.e., variances permitting property
to be used for a purpose different than those purposes specified in the
zoning ordinance, are prohibited." Decisions of the board are subject
to court review by certiorari.2
The statute governing boards of zoning appeals in all other cities,
towns, and counties provides that the board shall grant a variance:
[such] as will not be contrary to the public interest, where,
owing to special conditions, a literal enforcement of the pro-
visions of the ordinance will result in unnecessary hardship,
and so that the spirit of the ordinance shall be observed and
substantial justice done.2
Here, too, the decision of the board is subject to court review by certi-
orari.-"'
Additional standards for the granting of variances have been estab-
lished by case law. For example, monetary loss resulting from the applica-
tion of a zoning ordinance which permits only economically unreasonable
uses may constitute "unnecessary hardship" within the meaning of the
statutes." However, economic loss resulting from causes other than ap-
mission by the executive director of the metropolitan planning department if he finds
that the grant raises a substantial question of zoning policy. IND. ANN. STAr. §
53-969 (Supp. 1972). This procedure is unique to Marion County. If no such appeal is
taken, the decision of the board of zoning appeals is subject to judicial review by
certiorari. If the executive director takes an appeal, a writ of certiorari may be
sought only against the decision of the plan commission. IND. CODE § 18-7-2-76
(1971), IND. ANN. STAT. § 53-974 (Supp. 1972).
19. Ixn. CODE § 18-7-4-78 (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. § 53-1077 (1964).
20. Id. Non-use variances permit deviations from height, area, bulk and similar
requirements.
21. IND. CoDE § 18-7-4-83 (1971), Irn. ANN. STAT. § 53-1082 (Supp. 1972).
22. IND. CODE § 18-7-5-82 (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. § 53-778 (1964). The
"unnecessary hardship" language in this statute is generally construed in accordance
with the holding in Otto v. Steinhilber, 282 N.Y. 71, 24 N.E.2d 851 (1939), that for
a board to grant a variance on the ground of unnecessary hardship there must be a
showing that:
(1) the land in question cannot yield a reasonable return if used only for a
purpose allowed in that zone; (2) that the plight of the owner is due to
unique circumstances and not to the general conditions in the neighborhood
which may reflect the unreasonableness of the zoning ordinance itself; and
(3) that the use to be authorized by the variance will not alter the essential
character of the locality.
Id. at 76, 24 N.E.2d at 853.
23. IND. CODE § 18-7-5-87 (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. § 53-783 (1964).
24. Metropolitan Bd. of Zoning Appeals v. Gateway Corp., - Ind. - , 268
N.E.2d 736 (1971).
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plication of the zoning ordinance does not produce the "unnecessary hard-
ship" required for variance purposes. 5 In addition, it has been held that
self-created hardship does not justify a variance.2" Also, whether a vari-
ance shall be granted cannot be determined by polling the sentiments of
neighboring property owners. 7
Despite the presence of such standards, evidence from Marion County
indicates that an excessive number of variances is granted.2" Moreover,
this situation is not unique. Numerous studies in other states have re-
vealed a similar pattern, in that a very high proportion of all variance re-
quests are granted.29 Since variances are designed to provide relief from
zoning ordinances in relatively rare cases,"0 such excessive variances
indicate a malfunctioning of the variance granting system.
PROBLEMS IN VARIANCE ADMINISTRATION
The malfunction of the variance granting system in Indiana is at-
25. Light Co. v. Houghton, 141 Ind. App. 93, 226 N.E.2d 341 (1967). In Hough-
ton, the petitioner requested a variance so that he could operate an appliance store on
land in a residential neighborhood. He was already using the land for a golf course.
The alleged hardship arose out of the petitioner's need to keep his personnel employed
during the winter months and to earn enough money to make mortgage payments on
the golf course. The court stated, "the loss of . . . employment, however regrettable
to the employees, is not a hardship which arises out of the application of the Zoning
ordinance." Id. at 96, 226 N.E.2d at 343.
26. Bd. of Zoning Appeals v. Waskelo, 240 Ind. 594, 168 N.E.2d 72 (1960). In
Waskelo, a property owner purchased a house on a lot 100 feet wide in a district where
the zoning ordinance required a minimum lot width of fifty feet. He sold the house and
56 feet of land, and then requested a variance to build a house on the remaining 44 feet.
His request was denied by the board and the supreme court affirmed, stating
The rule applicable here is stated in 58 Am. Jur., Zoning, § 208, p. 1053,
as follows:
"Ordinarily, a claim of unnecessary hardship cannot be based
upon conditions created by the owner or applicant."
Id. at 597, 168 N.E.2d at 73.
27. Town of Homecroft v. Macbeth, 238 Ind. 57, 148 N.E.2d 563 (1958).
28. A study of 156 use variance petitions considered at nine meetings of the
Metropolitan Board of Zoning Appeals during 1966 and 1967 revealed that
while the Board at times does specifically request the petitioner to show that
each of the criteria are satisfied, such strict adherence to the [statutory] pre-
requisites is the exception, not the rule.
Note, The Effect of Statutory Prerequisites on Decisions of the Board of Zoning Ap-
peals, 1 IND. L.F. 398, 404-05 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Statutory Prerequisites].
Eighty-six per cent of these variance petitions were granted. Id. at 410.
29. Eighty-five per cent of all variance petitions decided in Cambridge, Massachu-
setts, in 1952 were granted, including 84 per cent of the use variance petitions and 86 per
cent of the non-use variance petitions. C. HAAR, LAND USE PLANNING 296 (1959).
Eighty-one per cent of all appeals in Boston were successful, and 99 per cent of these
were for use variances. Note, Administrative Discretion in Zoning, 82 HARV. L. REv.
668, 673 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Administrative Discretion]. See also Duke-
minier, supra note 13, at 321; Shapiro, Zoning Variance Power-Constructive it
Theory, Destructive in Practice, 29 MD. L. REv. 3 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Shapiro].
30. YOxELY, supra note 9.
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tributable to two factors: (1) the lay nature of the boards of zoning ap-
peals, and (2) the lack of effective control over the operations of the
boards.
Expert training for board members is not required under any of the
enabling statutes," yet the board must deal with complex technical
matters, particularly in use variance cases. Expertise is especially neces-
sary for determination of such factors as the risk of smoke and noise
nuisance, revenue generation, traffic patterns, and sewage disposal ca-
pacity. The board, which should consider these matters when determining
the effect of a variance on the community, not only lacks expertise itself,
but also lacks any institutionalized tie to the city or county planning
staff. 2 Local planning experts may present evidence and make recom-
mendations to the board, but the board is not required to adopt them.33
Similarly, the board is required to deal with such legal questions as the
difference between an unconstitutional taking and unnecessary hardship,"
often without any formal legal advice.
Two additional problems concerning the composition of the boards
have been raised. It has been suggested that those board members ap-
pointed as representatives of community business and political interests
31. This situation is not peculiar to Indiana. A study of 14 major cities found
that requirements that board of zoning appeals members have training in city planning or
architecture existed in only two of the cities; and in one of these two cities, the require-
ment was that only one member of a five-member board have such training. Admin-
istrative Discretion, supra note 29, at 675.
32. There is no statutory requirement that the board obtain an expert opinion
before making its decision or that an expert attend board hearings.
33. In the Marion County study, see note 28 supra, it was found that the Board
granted sixty per cent of the petitions to which the planning staff had objected.
Statutory Prerequisites, supra note 28, at 409. The findings in Indiana are paralleled
closely by those from other states. In Boston, during the years 1965-66 the Board ap-
proved variances in 72 per cent of the cases in which the Redevelopment Authority
recommended denial. Adnzinistrative Discretion, supra note 29, at 674. See also Duke-
minier, supra note 13, at 329; Shapiro, supra note 29, at 12.
34. In Town of Homecroft v. Macbeth, 238 Ind. 57, 148 N.E.2d 563 (1958), the
court held that an ordinance precluding the use of property for all purposes for which
it is reasonably well adapted is unconstitutional as applied to that property. It has
also been held that the violation of a property owner's constitutional right entitles
him to a variance even without proof of the statutory standards. Bd. of Zoning Appeals
v. Koehler, 244 Ind. 504, 194 N.E.2d 49 (1963). These cases suggest that a petitioner
is entitled to a variance upon a showing either that he meets the statutory requirements
or that the application of the zoning ordinance to his property is unconstitutional because
it cannot be put to any reasonable use. But see Suess v. Vogelgesang, - Ind. App.
- , 281 N.E.2d 536 (1972), a Marion County case in which it was held that there is
unnecessary hardship under the statute if the property "cannot reasonably be put to
conforming use." Id. at 540. This case suggests that if the zoning ordinance deprives a
property owner of any reasonable use of his property, he is entitled to a variance only
if it is also shown that the other four statutory prerequisites are met. The inconsistency
of these cases leaves boards without clear guidelines for determining when the statutory
standards should be ignored in favor of a constitutional standard.
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are likely to be oversensitive to these interests, and also that some board
decisions are motivated by improper external or ex parte influence.3"
The second problem of the variance granting system is the lack of
control over the boards of zoning appeals. Effective control can theoret-
ically be accomplished through constraints on powers by delegation,
judicial review, and political control through political responsibility. None
of these methods presently exert effective control in this state.
An administrative agency, such as the board, could be controlled by a
delegating statute that sharply delineates the limits of its power. Specific
limitations on the exercise of board powers dissuade improper action.
They also provide clear standards for judicial review. In Indiana, the
delegating statute is an ineffective control mechanism because the statutory
language applicable to most jurisdictions 6 is extremely vague and, even
with the judicial interpretations that have been provided,"7 leaves boards
with no clear guidelines. The statutes applicable to Marion County"
and those counties which have adopted unified planning"o are more speci-
fic, but nevertheless require application of the vague standard of "unneces-
sary hardship."4
Another potential source of control is judicial review. While courts
have the power to review the boards' decisions for illegality,4' this method
of control has proved ineffective for a variety of reasons. Initially, the
statutory language gives broad discretion to the board. Therefore, many
board actions which may be undesirable in practice are nevertheless legal
within the statutes. Secondly, courts reviewing board decisions which
grant variances use the substantial evidence of probative value standard.
35. See generally Shapiro, supra note 29. It is difficult to evaluate the relative
importance of these factors, but it is also probably unnecessary to do so. The other
causes of malfunctioning are certainly the primary ones. Moreover, the remedies to
be proposed in this note would greatly decrease the possibility that the advancement
of special interests and ex parte influence could disturb the proper functioning of the
board.
36. See note 22 supra & text accompanying.
37. See notes 24-27 supra & text accompanying.
38. See note 17 supra & text accompanying.
39. See note 19 supra & text accompanying.
40. The Marion County study, see note 28 supra, found that none of the 156
variance requests studied were denied for failure to find "unnecessary hardship."
Statutory Prerequisites, supra note 28, at 408. There is a problem with the "unneces-
sary hardship" standard in addition to its vagueness. Variances may be desirable
where the community would benefit from the variafice, but there is no unreasonable
restriction on the use of property and therefore no hardship. Dukeminier, supra note
13, at 346. Such variances are theoretically impossible under the current variance
standards. See Comment, The General Welfare, Welfare Economics, and Zoning
Variances, 38 S. CAL. L. REv. 548 (1965).
41. Light Co. v. Houghton, 141 Ind. App. 93, 226 N.E.2d 341 (1967).
42. Vogelgesang v. Shackelford, 146 Ind. App. 248, 254 N.E.2d 205 (1970).
VARIANCE ADMINISTRATION
Even though a great deal of evidence may indicate that a variance should
not have been granted, the court is powerless to review that evidence; it
can only determine whether there was sufficient evidence to support the
board's finding. Thus, the board has great latitude without effective con-
trol." Finally, judicial review is necessarily ineffective since it is seldom
exercised,"4 and because courts, like boards of zoning appeals, lack the
technical expertise required to solve land use problems.
The third potential method of controlling board actions is holding
board members politically responsible.4" However, no effective political
control over the variance authorization process presently exists.4" There
are several reasons why this method of control is not feasible. The public
is even less likely to understand the complex technical and legal issues
relating to variances than is a lay board, and the costs of dissemination
and public assimilation of the necessary information would be prohibitive.
In addition, the chance of partisan considerations and er parte infltuence
affecting board decisions might be increased by making board members
politically responsible.
PROPOSED REMEDIES
To remedy the lack of expertise on the board, either the lay nature
of the board must be changed or those matters requiring expertise must be
removed from the jurisdiction of the board. The present lay membership
could be replaced by a board of experts or by a single administrator."'
43. If the board denies a variance, the court, in order to reverse, must find as a
matter of law that the statutory standards were established. Speedway Bd. of Zoning
Appeals v. Standard Concrete Materials, - Ind. App. -, 276 N.E.2d 589 (1971).
44. See Shapiro, supra note 29, at 16. The paucity of appeals can be attributed
to the fact that most petitions are granted and those opposed to such petitions are
unlikely to appeal because they are loosely organized and poorly financed. Note,
Indiana Variance Proceedings and The Application of Res Judicata, 46 IND. L.J. 286
(1971). Moreover, the ill effects of the variance are likely to be spread over a number
of parties, and the cost of the variance to each one may be less than the cost of an
appeal. In addition, transaction costs, or the costs of organizing all opponents to
bring an appeal, may be prohibitive.
45. It has been argued that political control is the most attractive means of
remedying difficulties in variance administration. Administrative Discretion, supra
note 29.
46. One cause of the present lack of political control is the low visibility of
board decisions. This results from the lack of in-depth publicity of board decisions
and the public's inability to understand the issues involved. A second cause is that
board members are appointed rather than elected. Of course, pressure could be
exerted on the political parties appointing undesirable board members. However, there
are several appointing parties, and it is therefore difficult to fLx responsibility for
appointments.
47. Reps, supra note 10, at 296. It is now possible to have an expert board in
Indiana; the local appointing officials need only choose experts. However, there is
no indication that this is being done. For example, the Marion County Board in
1967 consisted of six real estate salesmen, three corporate executives, two attorneys, two
247
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Where lay members are retained they should be provided with an institu-
tional tie to a planning expert or the local planning department,48 and con-
sideration of expert opinion should be mandatory." Alternatively, the
expert input could be provided by including a municipal zoning admin-
istrator or zoning ombudsman in the variance granting system."0 This
official would appeal variance decisions that he thinks are contrary to
law."' The ombudsman procedure is approximated in Marion County,
where the Executive Director of the planning department is authorized to
seek pre-judicial review of Board decisions by the plan commission. "2 In
businessmen, two insurance salesmen, one teacher, one engineer, one accountant, one
public servant, and one person in public relations. Statutory Prerequisites, supra note
28, at 403 n.44.
48. It has been argued that this scheme is especially desirable because it separates
the function of expert evaluation from that of hearing public complaints. Administra-
tive Discretion, supra note 29, at 680. This bifurcation of function should more clearly
indicate the expert opinion on a petition than would a decision by an expert administra-
tor sitting in place of a board. In the latter case, the decision might have elements of
both expertise and political compromise, yet it would probably be treated solely as an
expert opinion, and therefore might be given undue weight on review.
49. This change could be effected by state statute, by local zoning ordinance, or
by the local boards themselves under their statutory power to promulgate procedural
rules. INn. CODE § 18-7-2-69 (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. § 53-967 (Supp. 1972) (boards
in counties with first class cities); INn. CODE § 18-7-4-77 (1971), I n. ANN. STAT.
§ 53-1076 (1964) (boards in counties with area planning departments); IND. CODE §
18-7-5-81 (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. § 53-777 (1964) (all other boards).
The expert opinion required should include factual information on technical matters
and recommendations on whether the variance should be granted. The recommendations
should be treated as rebuttable presumptions; if a decision contrary to the recom-
mendation is made, the basis of the decision should be fully explained in the record.
50. Shapiro, supra note 29, at 21.
51. In bringing the appeal, the ombudsman would act as the representative of
city or community interests. This would facilitate judicial review of board decisions
granting variances, which are now rarely reviewed. Supra note 44 & text accompanying.
Alternatively, the ombudsman could review board decisions, and parties could appeal
his decision to the courts.
52. During 1966 and 1967, the Executive Director appealed only ten cases.
Statutory Prerequisites, supra note 28, at 409. In 1966, about 353 use variances were
granted. Id. at 410. If the number of use variance requests in 1967 was approximately
the same as in 1966, the Executive Director appealed less than two per cent of all
variance grants. Even more startling is the fact that the Executive Director appealed
only 6.7 per cent of the use variances granted by the Board over objections by the
planning staff. Id. It is obvious that appeal by the Executive Director does not result
in effective review. Perhaps a zoning ombudsman without the other planning duties
of the Executive Director would be able to provide closer expert supervision of board
decisions.
Another method of providing expert advice on variance decisions is to have deter-
minations of the local boards appealable to a state review agency composed of planning
and zoning specialists, whose decision in turn would be subject to court review. Babcock,
The Unhappy State of Zonin9 Administration in Illinois, 26 U. Ci. L. REv. 509, 539(1958). However, this plan has several disadvantages. It adds another layer of
bureaucracy, with its attendant costs, to the variance process, and causes delay in the
input of expert opinion. Administrative Discretion, supra note 29. Furthermore,
under the plan, final decisions in many cases would be made without any expert advice be-
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addition to expert technical advice, board members should be provided
with expert legal advice defining the role of the board, identifying what
conditions warrant granting or denying a variance, and explaining the
applicable rules of evidence and burden of proof.
Lack of expertise in the variance granting process is especially harm-
ful when a petitioner seeks a use variance. These petitions require expert
analysis since they are likely to raise the most technical questions and to
have the most widespread effect on a community. Therefore, use variance
jurisdiction should be removed from the board. The removal of use vari-
ances would not be particularly burdensome to property owners since most
inabilities to use property can probably be cured by non-use variances"3
or by rezoning, alternatives which would still be available. 4 Use vari-
ances are already prohibited in jurisdictions with unified county plan-
ning." Moreover, if the requirements for variances in other jurisdic-
tions" were clearly understood and strictly applied, few use variances
would be granted. These jurisdictions should require that the hardship on
the petitioner result from some condition unique to his property, and
that the variance will not substantially alter the character of the neighbor-
hood."7 These criteria are seldom met."
cause most decisions would not be appealed to the state review agency for the same
reasons that most decisions are presently not appealed to the courts. See note 44 supra.
53. An examination of use variances in Baltimore and Boston revealed "no
situation in which there was no person who could utilize the property under existing
use limitations." Shapiro, supra note 29, at 22.
54. In the past, variances were preferred over rezoning because the latter en-
courages spot zoning. It must be realized, however, that use variances as now admin-
istered have the same practical effects as spot zoning.
Another supposed advantage of variances is that they can be made flexible by the
authorization of conditional and temporary variances. E.g., Statutory Prerequisites,
supra note 28, at 411 n.86. However, conditional variances can be costly to administer,
Reps, supra note 10, at 282, and the standards for temporary variances are the same
as for permanent ones. Light Co. v. Houghton, 141 Ind. App. 93, 226 N.E.2d 341
(1967).
It has been suggested that some use variances which would be beneficial to the com-
munity are precluded by the "unnecessary hardship" test. Dukeminier, supra note 13, at
345. If standards are changed to allow such variances, they should also be handled by
the plan commission or by an expert board of zoning appeals. These bodies are better
equipped than the present board to determine the best interests of the community.
55. IND. CoDn § 18-7-4-78 (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. § 53-1077 (1964).
56. IND. CODE § 18-7-2-71 (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. § 53-969 (Supp. 1972)
(counties with first class cities); IND. CODE § 18-7-5-82 (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. §
53-778 (1964) (counties without first class cities or area planning departments).
57. See note 22 supra.
58. Reps, supra note 10, at 296. The authorization of a board of zoning appeals
to grant use variances has been held invalid in some jurisdictions as an improper dele-
gation of legislative authority. E.g., Nicolai v. Bd. of Adjustment, 55 Ariz. 283, 101
P.2d 199 (1940); Livingston v. Peterson, 59 N.D. 104, 228 N.W. 816 (1930). These
courts point out that the power to grant a use variance is similar to the power to
amend a zoning ordinance, and is therefore an exclusively legislative power.
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The second problem of variance administration, control of board
decision making, could be partially remedied by a uniform statute clearly
defining the powers of all boards of zoning appeals. At present, there
are three different statutes defining such powers. 9 There is no logical
reason why this differentiation should be made since the role of the board
should be the same in all jurisdictions."0 A uniform statute on board
powers would facilitate the development of court restraints on board
activity since the courts would be required to apply only one statute, and
any decision reviewing board actions would apply to all boards throughout
the state.6
Another control over variance authorization would be a greater
reliance on "special exceptions" in the zoning ordinance. 2 Since the ex-
ceptions are specified in the ordinance, board discretion in granting them
is more limited than in granting variances. In instances where the general
ordinance provisions cause hardship, a wider use of exceptions would
provide the relief now supplied by variances.6"
The court also has a role in increased control over the board. It is
the responsibility of the court to encourage and aid agencies in perform-
ing their functions. This responsibility can be met only if the courts insist
that parties bring all relevant facts before the agency. In reviewing boards
of zoning appeals, the courts have the power to hear evidence supplemen-
tary to that presented before the board, 4 but this power should be rarely
Other courts have held that the power to grant use variances is not legislative
if the statute delineates standards to be used by the board, and the board need only
determine whether the facts of a case meet such standards. For example, in Nelson
v. Donaldson, 255 Ala. 76, 50 So. 2d 244 (1951), the court found sufficient the language
of ALA. CODE tit. 37, § 781 (1940), which gave boards power to authorize such variances
as will not be contrary to the public interest where, owing to special condi-
tions, a literal enforcement of the provisions of the ordinance will result in
unnecessary hardship, so that the spirit of the ordinance shall be observed
and substantial justice done.
The courts using the "standards" approach have looked only to the language of the
delegating statute to determine whether the standards are set forth with sufficient
specificity. However, the courts should look to whether a statute in fact restrains
boards from making legislative decisions.
59. See notes 17, 19 & 22 supra.
60. A uniform statute on variances would not preclude retention of different
statutes governing plan commissions and board membership.
61. For a suggested statute, see Delogu, Suggested Revisions in Maines Plan-
ning and Land Use Control Enabling Legislation, 20 MMi E L. REv. 175, 203 (1968).
62. Special exceptions are uses listed in the zoning ordinance that are not permitted
as a matter or right but are allowed if the board finds that certain requirements are
met. If special exceptions are to be administered properly, the requirements must be
set out in the ordinance with specificity.
63. Of course, provision for special exceptions should not be too liberal or the
effect on planning and development will be the same as that under excessive granting
of variances.
64. IxD. CODE § 18-7-2-81 (1971), IND. AxN. STAT. § 53-979 (1964) (counties
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exercised. Otherwise, a party requesting a variance need present only
meager evidence before the board, since he knows that most petitions for
variances are granted and that any defects in evidence can be cured on
appeal."' If, however, courts insisted on reviewing variance decisions
only on the basis of the record, petitioners would be encouraged to put all
the facts supporting their case before the board, thus permitting the board
to make better informed decisions. Courts should also pay particular at-
tention to whether the board's determinations of "ultimate facts" are sup-
ported by its findings of the "basic facts." Basic facts are those determin-
able without reference to the statute; ultimate facts are determinations of
whether the basic facts fit within the area of those factual situations which
are contemplated by the statutory scheme.6" For example, how much loss
a neighboring property owner will suffer if a variance is granted is a
basic fact. Whether such loss constitutes a substantially adverse effect
under the statute is an ultimate fact. Where board findings of fact are
determined to be insufficient, the court should remand the case and state
the guidelines for further board action. Such court action should encour-
age improved board performance in future cases.
Perhaps another way to provide more effective control over boards
is to enact uniform procedural rules for board hearings and deliberations
by revising the applicable statutes. Until such revision is accomplished,
all local boards should adopt procedural rules,67 make them available to
the public, and furnish copies to all parties. For example, petitioners
should be required to state the legal grounds for their requests. Also,
testimony should be under oath, and should be confined to the relevant
legal issues. Finally, "decision forms" that require each board member
to record the facts supporting his findings should be used.6" Such forms
with first class cities); INrD. CODE § 18-7-4-88 (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. § 53-1087(1964) (counties with area planning departments); IND. CODE § 18-7-5-92 (1971),
IND. ANN. STAT. § 53-788 (1964) (all other counties).
65. If the variance is granted and not appealed, the petitioner has avoided the
inconvenience of gathering and presenting evidence. If the variance is denied, he can
supplement the evidence on appeal to persuade the court to reverse the board.
Similarly, if the variance is granted and appealed, the evidence necessary to support
the grant can be introduced for the first time before the court.
66. L. JAFFE & N. NATHANSON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 1051 (3d ed. 1968).
67. See note 49 supra.
68. Although written findings are required, boards often fail to supply them.
The requirement of written findings is not statutory but was recognized in Carlton
v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 252 Ind. 56, 245 N.E.2d 337 (1969). "[T]he Board may
[not] grant a variance merely by making the five statutory requirements in the words
of the statute itself. For reasons which exist independently of the statute, the Board
is required to set out findings of fact which support those determinations." Id. at
64, 245 N.E.2d at 343. "[U]nder Indiana law, in order for . . . judicial review to be
done adequately the Board of Zoning Appeals has to set out written findings of fact
in support of each of its five statutory findings." Id. at 66, 245 N.E.2d at 344. In
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should contain the findings of the board as a whole, as well as those of
individual members. The findings must be of the basic facts as well as
the ultimate facts.
These procedural reforms would have several beneficial effects. First,
they would direct a board member's attention to the relevant factors in a
decision and discourage the introduction of legally irrelevant but poten-
tially influential evidence. Second, they would clarify what has occurred
at the board level, thus making it easier to identify and correct problems
through judicial or administrative review. Third, all parties before a
board could better anticipate what information the board will require, and
thus present and argue their cases in a manner that gives the board more
information on which to base its decisions. Fourth, written findings
would encourage more careful consideration of the issues by board mem-
bers.69
Finally, the boards should keep zoning maps with all variances re-
corded on them. These maps would help prevent the board from granting
so many variances in an area as to. change its essential character. As
variances accumulated in any area, such maps would indicate a de facto
rezoning. In this case, further variances would be beyond the jurisdiction
of the board and an official rezoning by the plan commission would be
required.
CONCLUSION
Since the malfunctioning of the variance granting system jeopardizes
the effectiveness of planning in general, these proposals should be imple-
mented as soon as possible. They are designed as a guide to immediate
action. The remedies do not in any way change the substantive concepts
behind the variance granting power. They only reform the system which
holds that power, in order to make it better able to carry out its func-
tion.
MARCIA R. GELPE
Vogelgesang v. Shackelford, 146 Ind. App. 248, 254 N.E.2d 205 (1970), the court,
citing Carlton, remanded to the trial court with orders to make written findings of
basic facts before the court would review the decision. Id. at 262, 254 N.E.2d at 213.
69. See 2 K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE § 16.05, at 444 (1958).
